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Abstract: This paper provides a comparative analysis of corporate law and CSR 
and asks whether there are lessons for Australia from corporate law and CSR 
developments in France. This presentation presents a summary of the provisions of 
the new French Act Number 2010-788 passed on 12 July 2010 – called “Grenelle 
2” –.  Firstly, article 225 of Law’s Grenelle 2 changes the Commercial Code to 
extend the reach of non-financial reporting and to ensure its pertinence. Secondly, 
article 227 Law’s Grenelle 2 amends certain provisions of the Commercial and 
Environmental Codes and incorporates into substantive law the liability of parent 
companies for their subsidiaries. In fine, article 224 of Law’s Grenelle 2 reinforces 
the pressure on the market to act in a responsible manner. It modifies article 214-12 
of the Monetary and Financial Code in order to compel institutional investors 
(mutual funds and fund management companies) to take social, environmental and 
governance criteria into account in their investment policy. 
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 The style of the presentation in the international conference ALTA has been kept. 
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This presentation exposes the last evolution in France concerning CSR: Law’s “Grenelle 
2”. Law’s Grenelle 2 is the non official name of a law adopted on July 12, 2010 as Law 
Number 2010-788 entailing National commitment for the environment. This law causes a 
great reform of the juridical landscape in France. Indeed, the aim of this reform is simple: 
integrating the environment in global French law (building law, environmental law, 
public market law, corporate law, financial law). In Law’s Grenelle 2, one chapter 
concerns specifically the problematic of governance. The implications of this evolution 
are crucial for the future of CSR in France. Several articles (224 to 227) show the 
French’s choice for hard law and mandatory rules to promote CSR and go forward of the 
unsatisfactory situation. The Law’s Grenelle 2 adopts a three steps process to implement 
CSR: increase the transparency (I), create obligation and develop liability (II) ... this is 
the trilogy used by the French legislator. My presentation examines the strengths and 
weaknesses of new rules as included in France through Law’s Grenelle 2. In twenty 
minutes, my commentary synthesises relevant legal issues and identifies some critical 
aspects. 
 
I – TRANSPARENCY: GO FORWARD WITH ARTICLE 225 OF GRENELLE 2 
 
In response to the indivisibility of business activities and CSR and the relevancy of 
information relating to their interaction to investors and other stakeholders, France's 
Assemblée Nationale (the French Parliament) reinforced mandate non financial 
disclosure as part of its law of July 12, 2011. For remember, this disclosure was 
introduced on May 15, 2001, Article 116 of the Law’s NRE – Nouvelles regulations 
économiques – which required all French corporations listed on the first market – premier 
marché – (and thereby possessing the largest market capitalizations) to annually report on 
the social and environmental impact of their activities. Article 116 becomes Article L. 
225-102-1 of the French Commercial Code. 
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A) A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GRENELLE 2: SOME FLAWS 
 
This law changed Article L. 225-102-1 of the Commercial Code concerning the content 
of annual reports to be filed by publicly-listed French companies. Article 225 of Law’s 
Grenelle 2 aims to extend the reach of non financial reporting. Indeed, several criticisms 
address to law NRE and his Decree of Number 2002-221 on February 20, 2002. This 
Decree completed France’s NRE and established nine separate categories of social 
information that must appear in the annual reports of listed French corporations. 
Similarly, the Decree provided nine categories of information for disclosure with respect 
to the environmental consequences of corporate activities. 
 
While a review of the implementation of this earlier law shows some progress made by 
listed French corporations, the Decree’s social and environmental disclosure requirement 
has been subject to widespread criticisms from report of ministries or market financial 
authority – AMF –, opinions of NGO or private groups (i.e. ALPHA group), studies of 
academics or experts. 
First, studies revealed that low number of corporations (around 20 %) adequately 
complies with the Decree or would produce reports far short of stakeholder expectations. 
Second, critics noted that the Decree did not establish specific indicators and 
methodologies to be used in the reporting process.. 
Third, the lack of non financial auditing requirements and sanctions for noncompliance 
also were cited as evidence of the Decree’s inadequacy. 
At last, critics concluded that mandated disclosure was fullness (for instance, what about 
Human rights or bribery?) and ignored the situation of non quoted corporations. 
 
B) THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GRENELLE 2: 
BETTER AND BETTER 
 
What are the relevant elements of Law’s Grenelle 2? There is a serious reinforcement of 
the mandated non financial disclosure. 
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First, Article 225 expands the perimeter of corporations concerns by the mandated 
disclosure. Now, the rule goes beyond corporations that are publicly listed in France: 
- Corporations exceeding threshold (fixed by future Decree) in number of turnover 
and salaries; 
- Benefit societies, federations and unions; 
- Investment enterprises, Financial societies, Banking enterprises ; 
- Insurance societies and certain cooperatives; 
- Public corporations. 
Second, the scope of the non financial information is extended. Article 225 fits to the 
social and environmental disclosure the societal commitment of the corporations. 
Third, about the non financial information, Article 225 of Law’s Grenelle 2 imposes the 
adequacy between those and international and European standards. The new rule 
implemented in France recommends a framework to be used in satisfying the disclosure 
requirements. Moreover, Article 225 asserts that the methods of presentation of non 
financial information must allow comparing social and environmental impact between 
corporations. 
Fourth, there is a defined process by which companies must audit or verify the 
information set forth in their non financial reporting. A future Decree will determine the 
verification of the non financial information by an independent auditor. But, Article 225 
fixes the general framework of the auditor’s task: publication of an advice communicated 
to the shareholders in the same time of the annual report and publication of an attestation 
on the presence of non financial information required by the law. 
 
C) THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE GRENELLE 2: AN ASCERTAIN 
FULL EFFECT 
 
Does Law’s Grenelle 2 enable to give a complete answer? Law’s Grenelle 2 requirement 
is not flawless. Different questions should be asked. 
While Article 225 constrains French corporations to report on a set of non financial 
indicators, it does not describe with any degree of detail how this is to be accomplished. 
For that, we are waiting for the adoption of a future Decree. It would be passed few 
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weeks after the adoption of Law’s Grenelle 2 ... but we still wait for! The primary project 
of this text in progress has already been subject of serious criticisms. 
Furthermore, the identity of the corporations which are required to publish non financial 
information is considerably debated. The compliance with Law’s Grenelle 2 for 
important part of companies in France (SARL and SAS) is clearly uncertain. 
While the external stakeholders were expressly present in Article 225, a later reform 
removed this reference. 
 
II – RESPONSIBILITY: MARKET PRESSURE AND LEGAL ENFORCMENT 
WITH ARTICLES 224 AND 227 OF LAW’S GRENELLE 2 
 
On the one hand, Article 224 introduces innovative requirements for asset managers and 
Open-End investment companies – OPCVM in France – to constrain them to take into 
account the social responsible investment (SRI) in their decision. On the other hand, 
Article 227 breaks with the traditional French analysis in corporate law that considers 
each corporate structure as an individual entity. It is the famous problem of group of 
companies. 
 
A) THE NEW RESPONSIBILITY OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT IN 
TRANSFERABLE SECURITIES: FALLACIOUS GOOD IDEA? 
 
Law’s Grenelle 2 establishes new obligation in order to favour CSR. Article 224 of Law’s 
Grenelle 2 changes Article 214-12 of the Monetary and Financial Code in order to 
motivate the institutional investors (mutual funds and fund management companies) to 
take social, environmental and governance criteria into account in their investment. Until 
Law’s Grenelle 2, French legislation pushes forward more transparency. The regulation of 
the market financial authority imposes on the asset managers to disclose in their 
Statement of Investment Principles the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or 
ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and realisation of 
investments. Moreover, the exercise of the rights (including voting rights) in relation with 
their politics to the investments must be disclose. The French requirement may be viewed 
Australasian Law Teachers Association (ALTA) - Conference July 2011                        Brisbane (Australia) 
6 
 
as a continuation of the emerging trend mandating such disclosure Western Europe (for 
example: UK, Denmark, Germany, Italy) as well as elsewhere (i.e. Australia). These 
regulatory systems have numerous differences in scope, in object or in content. But, the 
whole of the rules have a common feature: imposing the transparency in politics 
investment and in the exercise of the voting rights. 
 
Article 224 is more intense and emphasizes the CSR movement through SRI. There is a 
growing interest in SRI in France. For example, Novéthic – a resource center for persons 
seeking information on socially responsible investing – shows that France is leader in 
management of socially responsible asset and that the amount of SRI has grown of 70 % 
at the end of 2009. If the legislative movement had begun with two laws adopted in 2001 
relating to Reserve fund of the pensions and Workplace savings, it becomes more present 
now. Asset managers and Open-End investment companies have to integrate non 
financial criteria. Hard law is used, all managers of collective investment are covered and 
sanction is possible. Nevertheless, critics could be noted. Firstly, the nature and the 
effectiveness of the sanction by French jurisdictions are uncertain and complex. In fact, 
no specific sanctions are adopted. Secondly, the current rule of law ignores an important 
part of SRI: those managed by unit trusts – Fonds commun de placement –. Thirdly, what 
is the real future of SRI in France (and in the financial world) without coherence of the 
non financial information? 
 
B) THE NEW LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES: THE IGNORANCE 
OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES 
 
Article 227 of Law’s Grenelle 2 is the product of the scandal caused by the case law 
“Metaleurop”. Company Metaleurop was a subsidiary exploiting polluted sites. It was in 
insolvency procedure and faced with the impossibility to take care of the operations of 
cleanup. Finally, this company was abandoned by his parent company and disappeared. 
 
Article 227 of Law’s Grenelle 2 changes provisions of the Commercial and 
Environmental Codes. The liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries is 
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incorporated in rules of law. This is a revolution. There was cases law which piercing the 
vieil of personality, but now … it is the Law! Article 227 of Law’s Grenelle 2 systemises 
the definition of the existence of any fault committed by a parent company and sets the 
legal limits on responsibility for the environmental obligations of any subsidiary. While 
Article 227 (first paragraph) is about a voluntary liability, Article 227 (second paragraph) 
is concerned with a liability based on a fault. The first liability is founded on an optional 
commitment of the parent company. The second liability is depending on a fault having 
contributed to the financial difficulties of the subsidiary. 
 
However, there are significant gaps in the liability of parent companies provision. The 
Law’s Grenelle 2 fails to fully address the difficulties of complex corporate structure. The 
definition of the term « subsidiairies » raises a serious problem: foreign subsidiaries are 
excluded from new rules. Consequently, this exemption discounts the future impact of 
Law’s Grenelle. In addition to that common criticism, others features of the law merit 
discussion: possibility to modulate the extent of the voluntary liability, exclusion from 
the one-sided commitments of the voluntary liability. 
 
 
In conclusion, the future outcomes of Law’s Grenelle 2 are difficult to assess. 
Nevertheless, we can say that there is a new dynamic in France, more global (non 
financial reporting, SRI and liability of parent companies) and perhaps more advanced 
compared to EU and OECD. 
 
 DISCLOSURE SRI PARENT 
COMPANIES 
FRANCE  ++  ++  +  
EU  +  0  -  
OECD  +  +  -  
 
